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Restore free movement for Scottish citizens through early membership of the EEA

Though it cannot yet be considered a long-term trend, there now appears to be sustained majority support in Scotland for independence from the rest of the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding the practical challenges of securing and then winning a new referendum on independence, Scotland could quickly find itself having to confront a range of hard policy decisions - such as whether and when to apply for membership of the European Union.

The policy of Scotland’s current governing party, the SNP, is for Scotland to “be an independent member of the EU”, but, perhaps understandably, the party spells out little detail for now about whether rejoining the EU would be a day 1 priority, or on what terms it would seek to join.

Finland holds the record for fastest EU accession process - the country applied for membership in March 1992, agreed the final text of its accession treaty just over two years later in April 1994, and joined in January 1995 - but it had also spent the previous two years, from 1990 to 1992, negotiating the European Economic Area Agreement, so it was well versed in the single market acquis by the time it applied to join the EU, and throughout all this time it wasn’t also bootstrapping a new state.

By contrast, the accession processes of the so-called “A8” central and eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 took between eight and ten years, with Bulgaria and Romania’s path to the Union being even longer.

An applicant Scotland would be in the unique position of having already been in the EU, and - assuming an application in the next few years - rather recently at that. On the other hand, it would have been a member as part of the larger UK, with a number of the institutions and structures required to plug in to the EU ecosystem having existed only at the UK level.

While it would be reasonable to assume that an already broadly acquis-compliant Scotland’s EU accession process need not take eight or ten years, it might also be prudent not to assume the best, Finnish case. One could imagine the government of a newly independent Scotland wishing, for important symbolic reasons, to apply for EU membership on or close to day 1 of independence, but for that application to then take some time while the country worked through all of the negotiating chapters with the EU, and in parallel built up its institutional capacity and operational track record, potentially culminating in the holding of a referendum on EU membership (something I would support).

For the sake of argument, let’s say Scotland’s EU accession process would take four years from start to finish - roughly one year longer than it took Finland, a country that had already been independent for 75 years at the time of its membership application, and around the same amount of time it took the UK to leave the EU. The question then arises of what should be done in the meantime.

While there are no precedents for non-EU members acceding to the European Economic Area (EEA), it would seem reasonable to presume (a) that doing so is possible, and (b) that the accession process might take less time than the two years it took to craft the EEA Agreement in the first place. Let’s err on the side of caution and assume it would take a newly independent Scotland a full two years from application to accede to the EEA (again, perhaps in part because the country would require some time to fully establish the institutions and processes required to integrate into the EEA structure). That would mean Scotland could rejoin the single market, and with it one of its most important facets, the free movement of people, within two years of independence. It would also allow the country to begin the process of moving out of rUK’s orbit and back into the European mainstream, while not requiring the country’s individuals and businesses to do this all at once (since, for example, EEA membership would not obligate Scotland to impose the EU's common external tariff on rUK imports).

Some will argue that EEA membership would be a distraction, or risk becoming a permanent state of affairs. In that latter vein, others may be quite happy with the prospect of being only an EEA member and advocate for this as an end state. While ultimately this would be a democratic decision for the people of Scotland and their elected representatives, such concerns could be mitigated against by setting out a clear long-term European integration strategy.

It does not though seem reasonable or sensible for Scottish citizens and residents to lose out on the myriad benefits of single market membership - most importantly for many, free movement between Scotland and the rest of Europe - for longer than necessary, solely for the sake of maintaining the ideological purity of 'nothing but EU membership'. We know what happens when ideological purity is prioritised above all else.

That said, while the EEA was originally thought of by many as simply a “waiting room” for EU membership, the three EEA EFTA states - Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway - now consider it their permanent home, and they may need some persuasion to facilitate Scottish membership for only a short period. Scotland should seek to build strong relationships with these countries early on (as well as with the EU member states), and explain to them its fundamentally pro-European perspective and strategy. It could offer to cover some of the administrative costs to the others of adapting the EEA Agreement to Scotland twice - firstly, as a non-EU member, and then subsequently as an EU member state. Accepting English as sufficient from an official language perspective would smooth the path here, since legislative acts, joint committee decisions, etc would not require to be further translated (in the way that they do need to be for Iceland and Norway).

Let’s be clear: the SNP are right to say that Scotland should be an independent member of the European Union. I, like many other Scots, want to be an EU citizen again. I want to be able to once more play a full part in the democratic life of the European Union - by voting in elections to the European parliament, participating in European citizens’ initiatives, and so on - and to enjoy the benefits of an integrated market and economic space that only the combination of the single market and customs union provides.

However, we should also be pragmatic. No matter how much we may want the situation to be otherwise, it will take time to decouple Scotland from rUK, to establish the full panoply of institutions and systems of governance befitting an advanced economy like that of Scotland, and to meet all of the conditions of EU membership. (And we haven't even talked here about the euro.)

In the meantime, an independent Scotland should prioritize early accession to the European Economic Area - within one year of independence if possible - and, with free movement of people restored, enable Scots to start plugging back in to the economic, regulatory and cultural ecosystem of the continent.

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