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Why the whole UK should emulate Switzerland's pragmatism and join the EU SPS area

As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated in stark terms, one of the fundamental responsibilities of the state is the protection of public health. While governments are of course exercised by the threat posed by anthroponotic pathogens (like SARS-CoV-2 or HIV now are), they are equally concerned about pathogens transmitted from or between animals and plants (not least of all because human pandemic viruses can originate in the animal kingdom), as well as more broadly about anything which might endanger human, animal or plant life or health.

For this reason, governments impose so-called sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. SPS measures are regulatory measures designed to protect humans from pathogens and contaminants carried by animals and plants, and to protect the animals and plants themselves from such pathogens and contaminants. (For clarity, SPS measures do not concern the protection of humans from transmissible diseases within the human population, which may be achieved with public health measures.)

Enforcement of SPS measures happens both within the state and at the borders between the state and other states. In the case of the European Union, which has decided to form - along with some neighbouring countries - a single 'SPS area', it happens at the border between that SPS area and other states.

Until 31 December 2020, the entirety of the United Kingdom was within the EU's SPS area. From 1 January 2021, only Northern Ireland is - along with Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and of course all of the EU countries. Gibraltar looks likely to join.

In other words, all of the wealthiest and most developed countries and territories in Europe belong to the same SPS area - even those like Switzerland and the Faroe Islands which have long eschewed EU membership.

Except now (most of) the UK.

Being in the EU SPS area has nothing to do with tariffs, quotas or rules of origin. Membership of the EU SPS area alone doesn't stop countries negotiating free trade agreements with other jurisdictions (see, eg, the Switzerland-Japan Free Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement). It simply means that those countries share a common set of SPS rules - in this case, the EU's - which they enforce domestically and at their external borders, in return operating no SPS controls between themselves.

Why would being in the EU SPS area be of interest to a European country, particularly one like Switzerland which has shunned the significant political integration implied by EU membership, and which in fact has relatively high tariffs on many agricultural products originating in the EU? (That latter point is not true for the UK under the terms of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.)

Would it really make sense for a country outside the EU to agree to follow EU SPS rules simply to remove some bureaucracy at the border?

Well, quite simply, yes it would - because that extra bureaucracy is by far and away the most onerous, inconvenient and time-consuming aspect of importing into the EU. The EU runs one of the strictest SPS regimes in the world, with 100% of incoming SPS shipments undergoing documentary checks, and up to 30% requiring physical checks.

One could argue that it is unnecessary to operate such a strict regime, particularly with respect to goods coming from countries one can presume to be safe like the UK, that the operation of such a regime is protectionist, and so on - but it is the reality and there is no point arguing with reality, particularly not when it's on your doorstep.

By way of aside, it is worth recalling that the UK will shortly be implementing a virtual carbon copy of the EU's strict SPS regime on imports from the EU (as it already does on imports from the rest of the world). Realising how disruptive SPS controls for incoming goods would be and not wishing to see TV news bulletins filled with pictures of empty supermarket shelves, the UK government decided to phase these in over the six months following the end of the Brexit transition period, but from 1 July they will be fully enforced. It is in any case largely these SPS controls - on the EU side - that have led to the food supply issues we have seen in Northern Ireland since the beginning of 2021, since food products moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland - still inside the EU SPS area - have to go through the same controls as food products moving to France or the Netherlands.

One might contend that the logical conclusion of the argument I am making here is that there ought to be a single SPS area for the entire world. However, being in the same SPS area as Japan isn't really necessary for a European country, as, for obvious reasons, there are few just-in-time shipments of animal and plant products between Japan and Europe. Even in this highly digitalised, Zoom-fuelled world, geography matters, and the vast majority of European countries' food originates from and is sold in Europe. (83% of the UK's food supply, for example, is sourced either domestically or from the rest of Europe.)

The EU's SPS regime at the border was designed for simple consignments arriving from distant markets, not large volumes of short-shelf-life, just-in-time food deliveries, potentially in mixed consignments. Given the size of the EU's internal market and the consequent ability for EU member states to source the vast majority of their food supply from within that market, not being inside the EU's SPS regime is a problem primarily felt by those neighbouring European states which are outside the EU - like Switzerland and the UK.

Some will contend that it would be intolerable for the UK - or, more precisely, Great Britain - to follow EU SPS rules (as Northern Ireland still does), given that it has no formal say over their content. In reality, though, the UK - or rather, England, Scotland and Wales, since the domestic aspects of SPS policy are largely devolved in the UK's constitutional setup - is likely to remain substantially aligned with the EU SPS acquis, (a) since there will be no compelling reason to implement wholesale divergences any time soon, (b) since the UK nations will likely wish to maintain similarly high standards to the EU (and in Scotland's case, perhaps identical standards), (c) given that food producers in Great Britain will still be producing for the 'EU SPS area' market (not least of all for Northern Ireland and Ireland), and (d) since the UK government will not wish to create additional barriers to trade within the UK internal market by moving very far away from the EU SPS regime which applies in Northern Ireland as a matter of international law.

Substantially gumming up the movement of animal and plant products in return for the theoretical possibility of doing things marginally differently to the EU doesn't seem like a sensible trade-off.

It's also worth remembering that there are many technical standards upon which we rely in our daily lives and which have potential safety implications - such as Wi-Fi, and 5G NR, the standard behind 5G mobile networks - which our elected politicians either have no control over or simply rubber stamp. It's something we don't generally get exercised about - or even consider.

And interestingly, the Alternative Arrangements Commission of Conservative MPs and business leaders proposed in its 2019 report the establishment of a single UK-Ireland SPS zone - both acknowledging SPS controls as a real issue (a "very difficult ... problem" was the term used in the report), and suggesting that the UK share its SPS regime with another state, with a "common rule book", thereby giving up its right to set its own SPS rules unilaterally.

Being outside the EU SPS area dramatically increases the bureaucracy required to move food within the UK, when trading with the rest of Europe, and for people taking pets from Great Britain to mainland Europe or the island of Ireland. Even people wishing to take a sandwich on a trip out of England, Scotland and Wales are affected.

In contrast, the benefits of being outside the EU SPS area are limited to purity of principle (that principle being zero alignment with EU rules, despite this being acceptable for Northern Ireland), and the possibility to adjust SPS measures (or rather, to loosen them, since stricter SPS measures are allowed within the EU SPS area if they are for legitimate public policy purposes) - for example, to accommodate the requirements of trade partners such as the United States. The tangible, real-world value of those benefits are in all likelihood marginal at best.

Joining the EU SPS area would make many, many people's lives easier and facilitate trade in our COVID-ravaged economy, with very little downside. The UK should put pragmatism above high principle and just do it. It's a no-brainer.

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